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T

he advent of the computer has enormously increased the efficiency of
modern economies, lending computational prowess to the organization
of industrial production, inventory, communications, the integration ofpower
grids, the control of financial transactions, and transportation routing. The
decentralized architecture of the personal computer, and its Internet platform,
have linked economic actors screen-to-screen, allowing direct communications
and disintermediated transactions, bypassing a cosdy institutional structure of
wholesale and retail agencies. The real-time communication of common written texts through e-mail and document formats has strengthened coordination
within and between organizations, permitting consultative processes to work in
staggered time. Cybernetic life has also brought new problems in public and private law, including data privacy, jurisdiction for regulating speech and the protection of intellectual property.
Challenges for the law in a cybernetic age will extend to the batdefield. Cybernetics have transformed war. In data-sharing, military planners were the first to engineer joint access to a common pool through the "DARPANET," fabled
forerunner of the civilian sector's Internet. In air operations and even for ground
forces, computer and sensor technology can eventually be used to construct a
real-time picture of an integrated batdespace, to be shared among friendly forces.
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Proportionality, Cyberwar, and the Law of War
Computers, supporting sensors and global positioning satellites will enhance the
precision of weaponry and maneuvers, supplementing human judgment with digital assessments. The accuracy of kinetic weapons will be improved by using optical matches of targets and trajectory, and reconciling the real coordinates of
projectiles and aim points. (Even in the last ten years, the navigational capabilities
of cruise missiles have been transformed.) Though budget constraints and procurement cycles may slow down the implementation of this virtual battlespace,
the prospects are clear. A shared system of observation and control will support the
adjustment of tactics, the dynamic targeting of the adversary's assets, the full integration of multiple weapons platforms, and safeguards against friendly fire. Advanced electronics and computing capabilities also hold the promise of confusing
an adversary's command and control, disrupting his operating systems, and masking his view of the battlespace. The future of national missile defense also depends
on the extraordinary computing capabilities that can handle massive data on
launch speed, trajectory, and atmospheric perturbations.
Computer technology will also continue to support American military transportation, communications, and logistics-essential in mobilizing, deploying,
and sustaining a combat force, so often the Achilles' heel oflesser military forces.
The American military is a far-flung force, deployed around the globe, conducting exercises, patrols, and peace operations in numerous theatres at once. Access
to common data and immediate communications can integrate a decentralized
force structure.
But the luxury of a new technology also can create vulnerabilities, and enhancement can become dependency. The sophistication of American military
operations may invite a new mode ofasymmetric attack. Opposing forces whose
own organization is far more primitive may attempt an electronic version of
jiu-jitsu. The same technological doors that permit easy communication also
allow unwanted foreign entry. The portals for adjustment of operations may
permit deliberate disruption. Encryption of data and communications has
grown in power, but code-breaking has also benefited from number-crunching
bionics. Protecting sensitive information through compartmentalization is more
difficult when access may be gained through trap doors and undetected keyholes. The quickly changing design of software and hardware, and the Pentagon's frequent reliance on commercially available products for "non-critical"
operations, also means that information technologists may not fathom the vulnerability of the systems they employ. Rather li~e war-gaming, defensive understanding is often gained only after a simulated attack. The advantages of
cybernetic organization for military campaigns must be weighed against the
dangers of compromise and disruption.
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Military law must also address the new architecture of cyberwar, including
the ill fit of existing nonnative structures for electronic warfare. A primary challenge for military thinkers is what to do about civilian safety. Over the centuries,
the operational harshness ofwarfare has been challenged by the ideals ofproportionality and discrimination. These ideals of the profession of anns, implemented by military commanders and their legal advisors, ask for a critical
distinction between civilian and military targets, and teach that military advantage always must be measured against civilian loss. Cybernetic conflict may pose
new hazards to civilian safety, taxing our traditional notions of the division between the battlefield and civilian life. It is well to consider some of these problems in advance in order to construct the necessary safeguards. 1
Discrimination among targets is a fundamental nonn of military law, acknowledging that there is, ultimately, an important distinction to be made between civilian objects and military assets. The idea of discrimination is rooted in
the beliefthat warfare should be effective, rather than punitive, and that wars can
be won "vithout deliberately harming civilians. The moral compromises of war
do not extend to unnecessary cruelty. Noncombatants are considered innocent
(even where, in their political lives, they may have favored a war) and enjoy a
right to life protected even in warfare. Apart from the ethical claim, there is a
practical reason to observe this scruple. The reciprocal practice ofdiscrimination
means that a soldier has greater assurance that his own family members will survive the conflict. A military operator also will see discrimination as the practical
application of economy offorce, saving one's firepower for targets that matter.
The nonn is further supported by a working hypothesis about war termination-anned conflicts may end earlier where defeated soldiers can reintegrate
into a workable civilian society, in which there is something to return to. Renewal of the conflict may be more likely if civilian society is left destitute and a
generation reared seeking revenge.
Proportionality extends the protection for civilians beyond the ban on deliberate targeting. Proportionality argues that dominant intention is not enough in
choosing the objects of destruction in a war. Even with a military target directly
in view, there must be some balancing between the advantage to the war effort
from a target's destruction and the foreseeable "incidental" damage to civilians.
The terms of trade in this moral exchange are not terribly clear, to be sure--the
relative weighting of military gain and civilian hann is a complex judgment that
involves both battlefield e:h."pertise and situational ethics. But at the limit, there is
an admitted case in which an ephemeral military advantage could not outweigh
enonnous hann.
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In the idealized account of the law ofwar, the operational code ofjus in bello is
equally binding on both sides no matter who was at fault in starting the conflict.
In this view, the operational norms regulating how a war is fought do not vary
according to the purpose of the war. The same tactics govern a virtuous or condemnable war. Jus in bello binds a combatant despite his status as invader or as a
victim defending his homeland. The perceived value of this separation is that a
third party or protecting power can monitor the observance ofhumanitarian law
without venturing into the hotly disputed territory ofcasus belli and the merits of
the underlying dispute. The international limits on the initiation of warfare, jus
ad bellum, are placed in a separate normative framework. (The practical tolerance
ofpolitical publics for this attempted distinction is another matter. Indeed, in the
preparation for the Nuremberg trials, at least one prominent scholar argued that
any use of force by the Axis, even against traditional military targets, should be
considered a war crime, since each use of force aided the Nazi war of aggression. 2 The obverse conclusion, that any tactic was permissible to defeat Nazism,
was not op~nly mooted, but may underlie some of our practical assessments.)
Protecting civilians is harder than it sounds on paper for a number of reasons. First, in modem warfare, the mobilization of national economies and war
production makes industrial plants and infrastructure into a second battlefield.
Economic assets are considered military targets for their support of the war effort. Critics have questioned the efficacy of particular air campaigns, but the legitimacy of weakening an adversary's industrial base and war production
facilities is generally accepted. Unless an air campaign can be confined to
night-time bombing, the targeting of war industries will endanger workers in
the plants, even though they are technically noncombatants. Locating war industries in urban areas is also likely to endanger residential areas, unless precision bombing is used.
Second, the rural conflicts of the Cold War and decolonization also challenged the protection of civilians. The techniques of guerrilla warfare typically
involve camouflaging insurgent forces among the civilian population as protection against more powerful adversaries. Distinctive military insignia or dress
has been a long-standing requirement oflegitimate warfare in order to distinguish civilians from combatants and the failure to identify forces traditionally
deprived the disguised combatants of the protections of the law of war, including prisoner of war status. But the norm of self-identification was derided as a
luxury in an era ofwars against" colonial domination."3 Undermining this rule
of combatant identification poses obvious dangers to innocent civilians. 4 In
civil war, terrorist tactics against civilians also have been deliberately used as a
powerful advertisement that the established government cannot guarantee
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protection. Governments, in tum, have used terror to persuade civilian populations to withhold support from insurgents.
The problem of target masquerade extends even to conventional warfare,
since combatants are sometimes tempted to disguise military assets as civilian facilities. Secreting a weapons cache inside a school building serves to collapse the
attempted distinction between civilian and military sites, and is an act of perfidy
punishable as a war crime. Misuse of a civilian facility deprives the target of its
protected status, but the damage remains because it makes combatants less inclined generally to respect the protection guaranteed to civilian sites.
The third source of heightened danger for civilians stemmed from nuclear
confrontation in the Cold War, with its strategies of deterrence through mutually assured destructive capability, flexible response, and counterforce targeting.
Even with the confinement of nuclear targeting to military objects such as missile silos, troop concentrations, and ports and airfields, the externalities of radiation, electromagnetic pulse, and a broad radius ofimmediate destruction meant
that civilian populations would have been gravely endangered.
Since the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of ethnic conflicts has continued to pose grave hazards to civilians. In a war whose target is the civilian
population itself, atrocious acts are often committed against noncombatants as
one way of causing populations to flee. The war aim of creating a mono-ethnic
territory is used to justify terror tactics in order to displace populations. Attacks
on civilians are not incidental, but rest at the center of the conflict, serving the
central war aim ofpurging minorities and ethnic rivals. Where advantage may be
gained by the rapid consolidation of territory, the employment of terror against
civilians is hard to contain.
Even with the most worthy war aims, the principled distinction between military and civilian targets may be under pressure (though it is still mandatory to
avoid terror tactics). In a humanitarian intervention such as the 1999 Kosovo
campaign, designed to stem the gross mistreatment of civilian populations, responsible leaders must seek to undermine the transgressing adversary's will to resist, using war as a mode of coercive diplomacy. Winning such a limited conflict
is quite different from the unconditional surrender sought in the great land campaigns of the world wars. Striking mobile military vehicles, tanks, and artillery
pieces in a mountainous terrain is exceedingly difficult, and (in a humanitarian
intervention designed to thwart genocide) an expedited end to the conflict may
be urgent. At least one high Yugoslav official has suggested that the Kosovo
campaign was abandoned by Belgrade because Milosevic doubted the ultimate
loyalty of the Yugoslav military. This disaffection was caused in part by the military's concern about how the steady destruction ofSerbia' s infrastructure would
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affect the welfare of their own families. While there is widespread consensus that
civilians must not be deliberately reduced to starvation or other life-threatening
conditions, at least one analyst has suggested that the rule of discrimination
should permit the disabling offacilities that sustain some conveniences of modem civilian life. The danger ofa slippery slope is evident-the loss ofwater purification and sewage disposal, for example, could cause devastating disease and
lies beyond the pale of easy ethical analysis. Yet the problems of stopping a war
that seems remote to the controlling polity are also evident, and the limit of
"mere inconvenience" does not abandon the broader norm of protecting civilian survival. The troubling question ofhow to persuade an adversary to desist has
not been made easier as well by the last decade's record of ineffective employment of economic sanctions as an alternative instrument of coercion.
Another difficult challenge to the conceptual categories of civilian and military objects has been created, ironically, by the new precision of guided munitions. With navigation by global positioning and optical recognition, aim points
and target impact may be as exact as the particular courtyard of a building in an
urban area. Targeting has an exactitude, and therefore a transparency ofintention, unknown to other wars. The targets sought in an air campaign are evident
and public. The five-mile radius of uncertainty that surrounded the aerial delivery of munitions in the Second World War served to obscure the target aim,
apart from internal knowledge ofthe campaign plans. But precision-guided munitions announce their destination, and pose the questions of target distinction
masked in earlier wars.
Finally, there is the serious dilemma of dual-use targets. This is again a problem of distinction between military and civilian objects. It stems from the joint
infrastructure of modem economies. Military and civilian facilities share a need
for electricity, natural gas, and oil to sustain their basic services. Rarely is there a
dedicated infrastructure exclusively serving military facilities. To disable the facilities that sustain a military adversary may unavoidably burden the local civilian
populations. In the Kosovo and Iraqi air campaigns, allied forces needed to suppress anti-aircraft capability and ground radar guidance in order to allow safe allied entry into hostile airspace. Mobile facilities, camouflaged and positioned
under the lee of a hill, are difficult to target even in clear weather. The only assurance ofsafe air space may lie in pulling the plug on anti-aircraft by disabling a
power grid. The legitimacy of doing so depends on a judgment about proportionality. Vital civilian functions such as schools, old age homes, and hospitals
may also depend on electrical power. The civilian harm from their temporary
disability must be conscientiously weighed against the military advantage. The
merger of military and civilian electrical infrastructure shows the difficulty of a
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strict principle of distinction, and the quandaries ofjudgments on proportionality. Oil and gasoline supplies, too, present a dual-use dilemma. Loss of refining
and storage facilities can severely limit an adversary's ability to field armored divisions for extended operations. Yet oil supplies may be necessary for the winter
heating of civilian dwellings in urban areas. The ability ofa regime to deprive its
civilian population in favor of continued military capability makes the linkage
even more painful. None of these real-world problems of ethics, law, and principle can be easily solved,s even while the law of armed conflict must maintain
the ideals of discrimination and proportionality.
The legal texts that have accompanied these historical changes are worthy of
note, as a preliminary matter. The Hague Rules of 1907 were modest in their
scope, anticipating in the Martens Clause that a changing technology and the
unsettled practice ofStates might make codification difficult. 6 The Hague Rules
forbid pillage and attacks on undefended towns, and require sparing, "as far as
possible," cultural and medical institutions. Arms "calculated to cause unnecessary suffering" were also banned. But some of the modem operational dilemmas
lay beyond anticipation or consensus.
Operational targeting was incidentally addressed in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, through the establishment of protections for hospitals and neutralized
zones for civilians who "perform no work of a military character," as well as the
right ofevacuation ofchildren and aged persons from encircled areas. 7 But in the
1977 Geneva Protocols, 8 there was new attention both to a broader definition of
proportionality and the nature of civilian targets. The effort was not altogether
successful for Protocol I has been disputed in several ofits features. The Protocol
was signed but not ratified by the United States, and was excluded by the Security Council from the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as a direct source oflaw for the tribunal. Its formal definition of
proportionality has been modified further in the Rome negotiations for a permanent international criminal court.
Article 51(b) of Protocol I deems an attack "indiscriminate" ifit "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." The International
Criminal Court (ICC) treaty limited the language, noting that military advantage is to be assessed in the context ofan "overall" military campaign-allowing
military commanders and operators to seek more distant, as well as immediate
objectives. 9 A military advantage, for example, need not be "temporally or geographically related to the object of the attack."10 In addition, the ICC treaty
notes that the military commander breaches a criminal rule only where the
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incidental loss of civilian life or Injury to civilians is "clearly" excessive. ll
"Knowledge" is an essential element. The uncertainties of war are legendary,
and the commander's assessment must be based on the information he has available at the time. Only where a commander, based on the information available
to him at the time, "knew" the damage caused would be clearly excessive, is
there a criminally culpable act. 12 This may include self-conscious knowledge of
the breaching ofa legal limit, as well as knowledge of the actual facts of the campaign. As noted by the committee of experts advising the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia:
It is much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms
than it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the comparison is
often between unlike quantities and values. One cannot easily assess the value of
innocent human lives as opposed to capturing a particular military objective.13
So, too, the text of the 1977 Protocol defining civilian objects was deemed
incomplete by the Rome negotiators. Article 51 (2) of Protocol I says, ,vith apparent clarity, that the "civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians,
shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats ofviolence the primary purpose
ofwhich is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited." 14 Article 52 prescribes that "civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals," but notes, tautologically, that "[c]ivilian objects are all objects which are
not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2."15 The search for specificity is
not gready aided by the next bundle ofnegotiated language. Paragraph 2 ofArticle 52 notes broadly that "military objectives are limited to those objects which
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."
The difficulties ofdefinition were implicidy recognized in the Rome negotiations for the permanent international criminal court. The implementation of
Article 51 noted the centrality ofintention-requiring proof that a commander
"intended" that civilians as such be "the object of the attack"-arguably requiring specific intent to cause such harm and knowledge of the legal status of the
protected persons.
The Rome drafters also attempted to craft a criminal rule to implement Article 52, condemning attacks where the "object of the attack" was "civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives."16 But the difficulties of
distinction in regard to dual-use assets is implicidy acknowledged elsewhere in
Protocol I. In Article 54, starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is
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prohibited, and it is equally prohibited to attack or destroy "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population" where the "specific purpose" is to
deny them to the civilian population. But attack is concededly permitted where
the asset is used in "direct support of military action," unless this would cause
starvation or forced movement.
How do these principles apply to computer attacks and computer defense, in
an age of cyberwarfare?
The requirement of discrimination between civilian and military objects
presents a substantial challenge in cyberwarfare--complicated as well by the
question ofneutrality. If, in a defensive mode, the United States were the victim
ofan attack on vital computer systems, the temptation to respond in kind would
be considerable. Yet the ultimate source ofa computer attack can be acutely difficult to determine--a problem magnified by the deliberate use of "looping" or
"weaving"-using another's server to disguise the origination of the attack. An
attack is likely to be sent through an unrelated server in order to mask its authorship, and a response in kind may end up damaging or disabling the "looped"
server. The intermediate servers may be largely dedicated to civilian functions,
and may even be in a country other than the originator ofthe attack. Even where
the retaliatory response successfully limits its impact to the ultimate point of origin, the counterattack may end up disabling civilian functions. The attacker can
use a civilian platform for convenience or in order to mask State-sponsorship,
even though the latter could qualify as perfidy.
In a world of real geography, it is simpler to frame a response to the problem
of unauthorized use of platforms. A sovereign State is held responsible to police
the misuse ofits territory. An insurgent force cannot launch cross-border attacks
with impunity, and one rationale for permitting a counterattack across the border is that the harboring State abandoned or was unable to discharge the duty to
police its own soil. The same duty could be imposed on the proprietors of electronic space and governing civilian authorities. But the organization of cyberspace is in private hands, and has no single authoritative source of police.
Misappropriation ofa server can be accomplished quickly and secredy, and even
if a server's vulnerability has been detected before, not every trespass on a server
is worth preventing. Unless the involvement of a nation State is evident, say by
advertising an available "free zone" for cyberpirates, a retaliatory response may
be disputed.
In addition, it may be far harder to confine the effects of the counterattack
than in a land-based response. Cyberspace counterattack is especially troublesome because the topography is unknown. The shape of cyberspace is truly
terra incognita, including a server's network linkages to civilian structures. In a
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conventional military campaign employing land forces or air attack against an
adversary, the proximity of civilian structures and other protected objects can
be mapped by surveillance aircraft, drones, or ground spotters. The information may be imperfect, and there may be no realistic way to avoid all incidental
harm, but there is some relative idea of the likely consequences of an attack. A
prepared target list or "bombing encyclopedia" is designed to permit estimates
of probable civilian casualties. The method of approach to a target may be
altered in some cases in order to minimize civilian harm should munitions go
wide of the mark. But in cyberspace, there is often a rapidly changing architecture oflinkage and control, and the attempt to intrude in order to map its geography may itself be detected and considered a hostile act. Nonetheless, one
might be inclined to propose a defeasible duty of "benign" or "humanitarian"
espionage--attempting to map cyberlinks in order to contain the consequences
of a defensive counterattack. The technic;u feasibility of this is open to question, with the added difficulty that the very act of intrusion may be detected.
For any form of cyber counterattack, one necessary scruple may be to build
firewalls into the very instrument of intrusion. Where it is not feasible to conduct benign mapping in advance, it may be conceivable to have the intrusion
device map or filter as it goes, for example, by characterizing the content of files
before it destroys them. This might help to distinguish between military and civilian objects linked to the same server. Another palliative may be to conceive of
proportionality as a dynamic matter. Greater damage to civilian objects may be
tolerated in order to eliminate a security threat, so long as the damage is reversible or, indeed, aid is given in its restoration.17
An additional problem in applying proportionality is the twilight between
criminal acts and acts of war. In the midst of a major conflict fought by conventional means, any accompanying electronic attack will be regarded as a matter of
utter gravity, justifYing a strong response against the actor, even with ensuing
collateral damage. But in a more ambiguous setting, for example, where a State
actor is gathering information that would facilitate illicit entry and hostile operations, there is no predicate that provides a classical justification for the use of
overwhelming force in response. To be sure, intrusions even by non-State actors, where they cause serious interference with vital operations or loss of life,
would fit the ordinary understanding of terrorism. But Washington has chosen
to emphasize the tools of criminal law in responding to most forms of terrorism,
attempting to arrest and indict members of international networks, rather than
treating them as combatants in an undeclared private war. Force is fully warranted to capture an international terrorist or thwart a planned attack, but criminallaw creates a set of expectations that are often frustrating to an effectively
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fought conflict. Criminal law withholds any justification of punitive force until
after proofhas been mustered in court and a verdict is rendered by an independent fact finder. Its proceedings are public, and the sources of evidence are often
compromised during a trial by the public disclosure of the methods of surveillance. Proofbeyond a reasonable doubt is an appropriate standard for protecting
domestic liberty in a civil society. The extraordinary difficulty of detaining an
individual offender is a worthy price to pay in order to preserve a libertarian political culture. But criminal law's demanding standards are founded on the assumption that civil society enjoys the underlying fidelity of the relevant actors.
International politics and the security decisions of nation States must sometimes
proceed on more ambiguous indicators. 18
In addition, the invocation of criminal law creates the expectation that action taken abroad will defer to local State consent. Because criminal processes
are public, any related government action abroad is likely to become known.
Actions taken for intelligence purposes that do not enjoy the consent of the
foreign territorial State may do especially grave damage to bilateral relations if
they are broadcast. Thus, when invoked, the criminal law paradigm tends to
dominate Washington's response to a situation, since all other modalities must
be weighed in light of the cost of their public disclosure. (Sometimes it is the
mere fact of publicity that will cause a foreign government to react strenuously
to an international security measure out of a perceived affront to its public dignity or amour propre.)
Recent negotiations for a convention on cybercrime illustrate the point.
Lengthy talks were conducted through the Council ofEurope, with the participation of the United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia. The draft treaty requires each participating country to criminalize various forms of computer
misuse, including deliberate denial of service through distributed network attacks, and to create real-time methods of preserving and gathering relevant
proo(19 This is especially important since tracing an attacker may be possible
only while the attack is underway and the actor is still on line. One of the treaty's
more controversial features would require Internet service providers to preserve
information at the request ofa State party. Nonetheless, a successful criminal inquiry will depend on the treaty cooperation of each country through which an
attacker loops his communication. It will not take much sophistication for a
cyber adversary to filter his messages through countries outside the treaty regime. Any direct response to the attack, through counterattack or disabling
measure, may be resented by the treaty States in the loop as "derisive" of the
treaty regime and discourage their later cooperation. Deference to the enforcement jurisdiction oflocal authorities is a premise of the treaty architecture, and
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yet may be unworkable for intelligence operations and national security measures. Private hackers in Europe offered their services to Iraq during the Persian
Gulf War, and, in a similar situation, the slow and deliberate processes of criminallaw may not be adequate for infrastructure protection.
Even if there is a decision to treat State-sponsored cyber attacks as acts of war
rather than crimes, it will remain difficult to identify these more serious incidents
in a timely way. In biological warfare, it has recendy been observed, it may be
hard to distinguish the spread of natural pathogens from deliberate acts of contamination. The same difficulty can arise in distinguishing a prankster or technological sociopath from an international adversary. The difference is surely
important in assessing whether the attack is likely to escalate as the diversionary
prelude to other more deadly methods ofwarfare. The ambiguity ofsponsorship
that one saw in the surrogate conflicts of the Cold War is likely to plague cyber
defense as well.
The dilemmas ofcivilian protection in cyber conflict are a circumstance to be
lived with. Technology may solve some of the problems it has created. And the
technological superiority of the United States in all modalities of conflict may
mean that we can afford to accept some risk for the sake of maintaining a moral
high ground. The best answer to the Solomonic cyber quandaries will require
the continuing collaboration of technologists, warfighters, ethicists, and, lest we
forget, experts in the law of war.
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16. See Rome Statute, slIpra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(ii), and Elements of Crimes, supra note 10, art.
8(2) (b) (ii).
17. A "first strike" against an adversary's computer systems, as part of anticipatory self-defense,
is another possibility that we may imagine. The disruption of a national computer network may
disrupt an adversary's military communications, military mobilization, the processing of targeting
information, and other vital military functions. But the attack may also present the same "dual
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dynamic conception of proportionality (pennitting greater damage with speedy restoration) may
be called for.
18. War and peace entertain different standards for lethal force in enforcement measures. In
civilian societies, the use oflethal force is generally limited to the prevention ofimmediate deadly
harm, with a high threshold of knowledge. In a state ofwar, the threshold for using force is lower.
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June 29, 2001, www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/projets/FinalCybercrime.htrn and
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